Frankly Hoon

Someone has apparently taken it into their head to interview Bomber Hoon, the hapless Minister of Liberation turned hapless Minister for Frogs and Huns. Giving what the Press Association considers "the most frank assessment of the post-war planning" (I wonder when the Press Association thinks the war ended), Hoon claims that the British and American governments "failed to agree on key decisions in the months following the invasion", at least until the British rolled over. The dismissal of Saddam Hussein's army and police force, which has put up to 350,000 highly qualified, disciplined and possibly somewhat irritated persons at the disposal of the insurgency, was "one of those judgement calls". Possibly with the benefit of hindsight, Hoon said he "would have called it the other way"; but Donald Rumsfeld thought that "large elements of Saddam's people" would be better working for the resistance than working, as in the past, for the government of the United States, so the British rolled over.

On the subject of the resistance, Hoon is characteristically observant: "Maybe we were too optimistic about the idea of the streets being lined with cheering people," he ruminated. He also admitted the possibility that "we perhaps didn't do enough to see it through the Sunni perspective", and put forward a daring solution to the problem: "Perhaps we should have done more to understand their position", especially since the whole insurgency is now one monolithic and ruthless conspiracy: we have, it appears, inadvertently allowed "'Saddam's people to link up with al Qaida and to link up ultimately with Sunni insurgents' in fomenting suicide attacks and sectarian violence". Nevertheless, as regards seeing it through the Sunni perspective, Hoon noted comfortingly that "I have reconciled it in my own mind". This is certainly helpful.